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LABOR IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY
John S. McKennirey*
I. INTRODUCTION
THE PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE is to offer some reflections on re-
cent experience within North America of the internationalization of la-
bor issues and particularly the response to this development expressed
in the North American Agreement for Labor Cooperation, the parallel
Agreement to the NAFTA. Why was this Agreement considered neces-
sary and how is it an outgrowth of the international economy? How did
it emerge as what it is? What has been the experience with it? The
answer to the first of these questions is found in the expanding scope of
international trade and trade agreements and the internationalization
of the labor field. The answer to the second question is found in the
dynamics and parameters that conditioned the negotiation of the labor
agreement. The answer to the last question is found in the experience
with the Agreement over the past two years.
II. CHANGING TRADE AND TRADE AGREEMENTS: NEW FORMS OF
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Year after year over the past thirty years, the value of goods
traded internationally has grown almost twice as fast as the value of
goods produced. This ratio extended over such a long trajectory has
reached the point where international trade is a predominant preoccu-
pation of virtually every major national economy.
We know as well that what is happening here is not just the
growth of trade in the sense of the volume of goods and services ex-
changed, but it is the internationalization of the production process it-
self, and of business services, of investment, of corporate structures, of
research and development, and so on. Trade has been transformed into
the more complex phenomenon of globalization. This includes a techno-
logical dimension with great implications for labor, because trade and
international business spread new technologies so rapidly around the
world causing major labor adjustments.
As trade has been transformed, trade agreements have also been
transformed. No longer do these agreements simply deal with tariffs,
national treatment, antidumping measures, and other "pure" trade is-
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sues, but they now bring an international order into an expanding
range of trade-related areas of economic activity: non-trade barriers,
investment policies, services which include financial services, product
and health and safety standards, government procurement policies, the
movement of business personnel, intellectual property rights; and, to
facilitate the working of these complex agreements, as is so central in
the NAFTA, they also include sophisticated international dispute reso-
lution mechanisms, which are themselves a considerable development in
international relations.
The rationale for the expanding scope of trade agreements is a
thesis with a major corollary. The thesis: trade affects us more and
more and so we need to be more concerned about the structures of
trade. And the corollary: whatever affects trade also affects us more
and more, and so we need to be more concerned about the factors of
international competition. Labor and environment were identified early
on in the NAFTA process as fitting both thesis and corollary. Increased
trade is likely to impact on the labor market and the environment; and,
at the same time, the way the labor market or the environment is man-
aged may impact on competition.
III. THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF LABOR ISSUES
An aspect of the overall growth of the international economy
through trade and globalization is the internationalization of labor is-
sues. Labor markets have been traditionally defined as essentially local;
people looked locally for work and employers looked locally to hire. But
they were also national, in the sense that workers were legally able to
move anywhere within their own nation to seek employment. But with
growing internationalization of economies, this local structure of the
labor market has been changing. While the vast majority of workers
still look locally or at most nationally for work, companies have begun
much more frequently to look globally at where they will locate work-
sites, and they will then situate worksites where economic conditions
are most favorable. Thus, from the worker's perspective, the labor mar-
ket retains its traditional local or national definition, being confined to
his or her area of labor mobility (with some exceptions for the highly
skilled); but from the employer's perspective, the labor market has be-
come international.
The effect of this development can be seen in heightened attention
to the international dimensions of labor issues, especially among ad-
vanced economies where the population has been most concerned about
what is called the "delocalization" of work. In the 1980s, the United
States began attaching conditions regarding international labor stan-
dards to its system of trade preferences for developing nations. During
the same period, the European Community (in response to the entrance
of Greece and Portugal) adopted first the Charter of Basic Workers
[Vol. 22:183 1996
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Rights, and later, the Social Chapter in the Maastricht Treaty. Both
were efforts in different ways and contexts to address the potential ef-
fects of the international economy on labor conditions.
In the 1990s, the NAFTA countries added a parallel agreement on
labor to their trade agreement, which was intended to deal with labor
issues internally to the free trade zone, while the European Union
(E.U.) adopted the U.S. idea of labor standards as conditions for trade
preferences as a way of dealing with labor issues external to the E.U.
Apparently, North America and Europe were watching what the other
was doing in the previous decade. Also in this decade the question of
the treatment of labor issues within the global trading system was
made the subject of working groups and studies in the International
Labor Organization and the OECD. There is discussion of a similar
working group within the World Trade Organization. There are other
manifestations, such as the recent and increasingly substantive discus-
sions of labor issues among the labor ministers of the G-7 countries and
countries of the Western Hemisphere.
Overall, what had been a local and national issue for so long,
bounded by the legal limits of labor mobility, has now taken on a much
more substantial international dimension due to the evolution of the
international economy.
The question is, how can national governments establish a degree
of influence regarding the labor dimensions of an economy which is so
clearly transnational in nature? Without such governmental influence,
the growing international dimension of the labor market would be with-
out the structures of political or public accountability. At the end of
the day, if the new international economy appears to evolve without
such structures, if it seems to be ruled only by the laws of Darwin
subjecting labor laws or other important standards to enormous new
competitive pressures, it is possible that public antipathy toward it will
grow. Most importantly, it may not be possible to ensure that the pub-
lic good, which is expressed in these laws, is equally protected within
the international economy as it is domestically.
While the answer to the question 'how' is far from clear, it seems
likely to demand new forms of international cooperation. And, in fact,
are not trade agreements with their expanding agenda becoming exten-
sive new forms of international cooperation?
The NAFTA supplementary agreement on labor is one of the first
concrete expressions of nations attempting to come to grips with the
labor dimension of the new international economy. It is, in fact, the
first international agreement on labor standards to be linked to an in-
ternational agreement on trade.
IV. THE CASE OF LABOR IN NORTH AMERICA
Before examining the negotiation of the NAFTA agreement on la-
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bor, it is worth considering briefly the labor context in North America,
in terms of labor markets and the different systems of labor law, within
which it was developed.
A. The Labor Markets
The labor market landscapes in the three NAFTA countries have
some important distinctions. The Canadian and U.S. labor markets are
characterized by slowing labor force growth and strong service sector
employment (over seventy-four percent of total employment in 1994),
while in Mexico the labor force is growing very rapidly and the
workforce is relatively much younger. In Mexico, a relatively high pro-
portion of employment, twenty-five percent, is in the primary sector,
wages overall are much lower, and there is more low-skilled employ-
ment than in the other North American countries. However, education
and skill levels in Mexico have improved considerably over the past
decade.
Another important distinction is in the types of workers in each
country. Mexico has significantly fewer employees, fifty-seven percent,
than Canada which has eighty-four percent, and the United States,
which has ninety-one percent, but substantially more self-employment
(twenty-five percent of total employment in Mexico in 1995, compared
with nine percent in Canada and seven percent in the United States in
1994). And, there is more unpaid work: thirteen percent in Mexico in
1995 compared with 0.4% in Canada, and 0.2% in the United States.
Unionization rates in Canada and Mexico are roughly twice as
high as rates in the United States. While unemployment in Canada is
much higher than in the United States and Mexico, the United States
and Mexico have higher levels of low-wage employment.
These observations serve to illustrate that the NAFTA was bring-
ing widely diverse economies and labor markets together in a new eco-
nomic partnership. In this sense, it was a microcosm of what was hap-
pening in labor markets globally as a result of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
B. The Labor Laws
Although in the NAFTA context, labor and the environment are
often mentioned in the same breath, yet the two are obviously distinct
fields, even in terms of international treatment. For instance, whereas
there have been at least fifty-six international treaties and agreements
on the environment concluded in the decade of the '80s alone, and
there are some twenty international environmental agreements which
include trade provisions, the NAFTA labor agreement is the first inter-
national agreement on labor to be linked with an international agree-
ment on trade.
[Vol. 22:183 1996
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This contrast illustrates how jurisdiction has been relatively
guarded over labor matters. While the International Labor Organiza-
tion (I.L.O.) (of the United Nations) has existed since 1919, subscrip-
tion to its international conventions is voluntary, as is compliance, even
if a country has ratified a particular convention.
The fact is, labor policy touches directly the social values and eco-
nomic philosophy of a country, and is universally a politically sensitive
domain. It is a subject which in many areas, especially concerning the
balance of rights between unions and management, employers and em-
ployees, contains different and often conflicting points of view within a
single country, let alone between nations. On the other hand, basic la-
bor rights are close to human rights and in that sense transcend na-
tional and local politics.
Fortunately, largely due to the historical efforts of the I.L.O.,
there has gradually emerged a substantial international consensus over
basic labor rights and principles. Several of the most fundamental
I.L.O. Conventions have been ratified by over one hundred nations.
There is an increasingly strong international awareness of the univer-
sality of such basic rights as the freedom of association, or the prohibi-
tion of forced labor, or the protection of child labor. In addition, in
many technical matters, such as occupational safety, many national
legislative codes have become quite comparable.
Yet, despite this historical progress on international labor rights,
the way fundamental labor rights are expressed in domestic law re-
mains a political hot potato. This is as true in the North American
context as it would be anywhere. Any significant change to labor legis-
lation is a major political issue. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
negotiation of what came to be the North American Agreement on La-
bor Cooperation was both urged by powerful forces yet bounded by
powerful constraints.
While the labor laws in Canada, the United States, and Mexico
reflect a common set of basic principles, and in technical areas were
found to be quite comparable, the fact remains that they are substan-
tially different systems. A few examples: all three countries are federal
states, but the jurisdictional division over labor matters varies enor-
mously. The United States has a single set of laws and a single enforce-
ment agency (either the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) or
the Department of Labor, depending on the legislative area) which ex-
tends throughout the entire national territory. Mexico also has a single
set of national labor laws, but enforcement power lies substantially
with the thirty-one states. Both federal and state labor agencies and
over 100 federal and state "Conciliation and Arbitration Boards" en-
force the laws. In Canada, the ten provinces enjoy sovereignty in re-
gard to labor law matters along with the federal government for feder-
ally regulated industries. There are, thus, eleven separate labor law
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systems with eleven labor departments and labor boards (or, in Quebec,
a judicial tribunal) to enforce the laws. (And this does not mention the
system in the Canadian territories.)
Or we might consider the basic employment relationship. In the
United States, the "employment at-will doctrine" still prevails for
many workers unless constrained by a union contract (which applies to
only about twelve percent in the private sector) or by laws against dis-
crimination. In Canada, due to the greater extent of unionization, in
addition to broader statutory protections on discrimination and broader
judicial rulings, the "at-will" doctrine has almost disappeared. But in
Mexico, the concept itself is anathema. Every employee works under a
contract of employment with just cause for termination required by
law.
Just as at the international level in general, North America dem-
onstrates both common recognition of general labor principles, but also
substantial variation in legislative and administrative application of
these principles.
C. Parameters of an Agreement
Within this context of labor markets and labor regulation, the
NAFTA labor negotiators worked within certain parameters of both
constraints and imperatives.
The supplementary agreements could not defeat the purpose of the
originating agreement, the NAFTA. The side agreements could not be-
come themselves barriers to trade. The fundamental objective was the
establishment of more order, broader benefits, and more certainty in
the trading relationship. The E.U. took similar care not to make its
labor policies a potential constraint on trade, which would have run
counter to the entire project of an economic union. The trade linkage in
the supplementary agreements to the NAFTA was carefully designed
to incorporate an effective monetary discipline, but not to create a
trade barrier.
Second, there was clearly no intent to establish a political union
among Canada, the United States, and Mexico. A trade agreement
may make some concessions to absolute sovereignty, but it does not
involve creating a common legislature to make multinational laws nor
common courts to enforce them. Voluntary international standards, as
in the I.L.O., are one thing, but international standards which could in
effect supersede domestic law is something entirely different. The
model of the E.U. did not apply in North America.
Third, again in keeping with the notion that the NAFTA did not
involve the establishment of a supra-national government, there was a
logical and practical constraint not to attempt to create a super regula-
tory agency empowered to investigate specific cases in a labor force of
over 180 million workers. The task of regulating the labor market must
[Vol. 22:183 1996
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remain with the labor agencies of the various governments at the na-
tional and subnational level, together with their relevant administrative
tribunals and courts.
The acceptance of these constraints is clearly expressed in the la-
bor agreement, which refers to full respect for domestic sovereignty in
the making of labor laws, as well as similar respect for domestic adju-
dicative proceedings, and recognizes that responsibility for enforcement
rests with domestic agencies.
Not all the conditions for the negotiations were negative; there
were also positive imperatives. The eventual Agreement would have to
address what had emerged in public debate as the real issues, the effec-
tive enforcement of domestic law, and safeguarding basic standards
from competitive pressures. Long in advance of opening the side agree-
ment negotiations, all three countries had examined the labor laws of
each other; and the common conclusion, which was not seriously ques-
tioned during the ensuing NAFTA process, was that the laws of the
other parties provided sufficient common ground on which a labor
agreement could be built. This is not to say that there was uniform
satisfaction with existing labor laws, but neither was there a demand
for major legal reform as a realistic or necessary condition for the
NAFTA.
Instead attention shifted to perceived problems with enforcement,
as well as the possibility of further deterioration of enforcement in the
face of intense competitive pressure for investment, and the potential
for relaxation of basic standards, again to attract or retain investment.
The Agreement would have to address these issues.
It did so by defining the basic elements of "effective enforcement"
in a series of central obligations, and by providing mechanisms by
which the Parties could hold each other accountable to these obliga-
tions. The Agreement also defined a set of basic labor principles and
included strong commitments to promote these to the maximum extent
possible, as well as to maintain high labor standards. While not subject
to the same accountability mechanisms as the obligations for domestic
enforcement procedures, the labor principles are important political
commitments for which domestic and international political accounta-
bility must be assumed.
There were other positive requirements. The three nations during
the NAFTA negotiations had developed bilateral cooperative memo-
randums on labor (Mexico with the United States and with Canada).
However, these agreements had been considered insufficient on two
grounds: first, they were strictly government-to-government arrange-
ments providing no direct access for the public to raise issues or com-
plaints; and, second, they contained no binding, enforceable obligations
on the Parties. What was wanted for the trilateral agreement on labor
was an agreement that contained significant, enforceable obligations,
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and which provided meaningful public access.
The eventual Agreement met these conditions by including binding
obligations regarding effective enforcement of domestic law tied to a
sophisticated dispute resolution process. Public access was assured by
providing for "public communications" which would be directed to a
special office in each country responsible to the Minister of Labor. In
addition, the Agreement contemplated the establishment of private sec-
tor and subnational government advisory panels.
However, incorporating these requirements also created a demand
for flexibility. The major political and constitutional differences be-
tween the countries, the sensitive nature of labor policy in all three
nations, the different traditions involved in public participation, and the
fact that labor law administration frequently involves independent ad-
ministrative tribunals, all argued for as much domestic tailoring of the
Agreement as possible. So, each country is able to establish its own
process for handling public communications and deciding how to pur-
sue them, and its own approach to private sector and governmental ad-
visory panels.
Finally, the Agreement needed to define its scope: what would be
meant by "labor"; what were the labor laws that would be covered by
the obligations; and what would be the overall scope of the Agree-
ment's objectives? A great deal could be covered by the word "labor,"
ranging from safety regulations to union formation to unemployment
insurance systems or training, or even basic education or employment-
related health care or housing. And what if certain labor subjects were
to be treated differently from others, as was in fact the case, how would
these specific areas be delineated? The solution was to rely on the set of
labor principles, only those laws related to the principles were labor
laws for the purposes of the Agreement.
Important additional definitions were needed to connect the coun-
tries' obligations to trade. The obligations needed to be linked to trade
because it was the prospect of free trade which in the first instance
opened the door to what otherwise would have been an intrusion into
the domestic sphere. Thus, the disciplines of the Agreement are con-
fined to industries that are trade-related.
The obligations also needed to be balanced because otherwise, a
country with the most labor protections would be opened to the most
obligations, and the country with the least protections would have the
least obligations. Obviously this would have contradicted common sense
and could have discouraged countries from adopting high standards or
even encouraged lowering standards. Thus, to correct this potential
problem, the right to challenge another country regarding its obliga-
tions is limited to countries which themselves offer the same level of
protection, referred to as having "mutually recognized" labor laws.
This, in fact, provides a benefit for adopting high standards, and elimi-
[Vol. 22:183 1996
8
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 22 [1996], Iss. , Art. 26
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol22/iss/26
McKennirey-LABOR IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY
nates any possible disincentive from raising levels of protection.
V. THE MODEL OF A TRADE AGREEMENT
As mentioned, neither the model of the E.U., a political union, nor
the model of the I.L.O., with voluntary obligations and enforcement,
was suitable for the NAFTA context.
So, possibly more by lack of an obvious alternative than by design,
the NAFTA itself came to serve as the model for the new Agreement.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this model is that, unlike the
U.N./I.L.O. model or the E.U. model, it places the governments not in
a vertical relationship to an international body, but in a horizontal rela-
tionship to each other.
The labor agreement is built on the principle of domestic law, as
is, for example, the NAFTA's Chapter 19 on trade law. Again, like the
NAFTA, the labor agreement permits the implementation of domestic
law, as in the NAFTA treatment of intellectual property law, to be
open to international review.
As in the NAFTA, the objectives of the labor agreement include
public information, greater certainty, transparency, and rule of law, in
order to improve the economic partnership. Like the NAFTA, it pro-
vides channels for private parties to raise issues across borders that af-
fect their interests. Like the NAFTA, it is fundamentally a partnership
model, concerned with mutual gain, rather than an adversarial or jurid-
ical model. It aims first to avoid disputes through information and co-
operation, second to facilitate consultations and joint examinations of
matters of concern, and only if necessary to formally resolve disputes
through recourse to a third party. Even its formal dispute resolution
process, patterned on Chapter 20 of the NAFTA, is designed to focus
on problem-solving recommendations.
A number of the labor agreement's principle objectives were first
expressed in the preamble to the NAFTA, specifically: "to improve liv-
ing standards and working conditions in all three countries." The labor
agreement aims to enhance the overall value of the trade agreement by
pursuing these objectives directly, and not just as a by-product of in-
creased trade. It envisages international cooperation and mutual devel-
opment focused on these common economic goals.
Following the model of the NAFTA Trade Commission, the labor
agreement creates a Labor Commission formed of the Cabinet mem-
bers responsible for labor in the three countries. This Council of Minis-
ters gives the three nations a new international institution established
at the highest level of national political office. It thus extends political
accountability for labor matters into the international realm in a spe-
cial new way. The national offices created under the Agreement and
the international Secretariat which serves the Council of Ministers,
provide an institutional framework for the three countries to work
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together.
VI. LIVING WITH THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY
Experience under the NAALC so far has obviously been limited.
Less than three years have passed since it came into force.
There have been a number of public complaints concerning the
enforcement of labor laws. These complaints have been submitted to
domestic governments, as the Agreement prescribes, and in two of five
cases the domestic governments have decided to raise the complaints
with the other implicated government. This alone is a significant indi-
cation of the governments' joint determination to give life to the
Agreement.
Moreover, in these two cases, the issue was related to the freedom
of association and the right to form a union and therefore could pro-
ceed only to the stage of Ministerial Consultations, and not to further
stages of evaluation and dispute resolution. Nonetheless, the govern-
ments have responded to these issues by adopting extensive programs
which have involved a high degree of public participation as well as
private sector and academic participation. It could be argued that
through these extensive responses, the governments involved have by
choice given Ministerial Consultations as much weight and public at-
tention as would be achieved under the Evaluation Committee process.
Again this shows commitment to the Agreement and willingness to ac-
cept political responsibility for dealing seriously with issues raised
through the Agreement's new channels.
In addition to these "public communications," there has been a
wide-ranging program of cooperative activities between the three coun-
tries organized by the National Administrative Offices; and the interna-
tional Secretariat is now also engaged in a new program of its own,
including a special study on the topic of sudden plant closures as a
potential blockage to the right to organize a union which resulted from
a Ministerial Consultation. All three countries are forming private sec-
tor advisory bodies to provide direct input to governments on national
participation in the Agreement.
VII. CONCLUSION
International trade is seen by almost every country in the world
today (as we can see by the growing size of the W.T.O.) as a means of
improving living standards, job opportunities, and working conditions
for its workforce no matter what economic level a country may be
starting from. But competition is not an automatic or unalloyed pan-
acea (as the history of countries drawn into single product dependency
has shown). Intensified international competition needs to be balanced
and complemented by increased international cooperation so that the
[Vol. 22:183 1996
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international marketplace can contain the safeguards and stability pro-
vided by basic laws and rights. This is obviously important in the com-
mercial sphere, such as in regard to intellectual property rights, but it
is also important in other economic spheres as well, such as labor
rights. The rule of law needs strong international support.
In the NAFTA labor agreement, the trading partners make ex-
plicit their determination that increased trade should be accompanied
by the recognition and promotion of the rights and interests of the
workforce. The labor agreement is an international discipline respect-
ing the application of domestic labor law, and in this it is an important
innovation in the new international economy. It is also a commitment
and a vehicle for three countries to work together on the increasing
range of labor matters that are international in nature.
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